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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

Asif William Rahman,

Defendant

Case No. 1:24-CR-249

**DECLARATION OF JAY M. MOEDER, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (NGA)**

Personal Background:

1. I began my career at NGA as a geospatial intelligence analyst in 1989. I am currently the Senior Advisor to the NGA Analysis Directorate. As the Senior Adviser, I am responsible for providing counsel and leadership on substantive and technical analytic issues related to the production of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). I optimize partnerships with foreign and domestic partners, manage risks to GEOINT analytic capabilities, and drive synchronization of NGA-internal processes that influence analytic activities. I also ensure that NGA's analytic products adhere to the highest standards of analytical integrity.
2. During my thirty-five (35) year career at NGA, I have served in numerous positions within the Agency. I have been involved in the creation and validation of hundreds of analytic products that have been provided to customers within the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, and White House. I am familiar with all of the standard techniques and tradecraft utilized by GEOINT analysts to ensure the accuracy of reporting (as well as of accompanying graphics) that are prepared to supplement intelligence products or to prepare discrete finished intelligence products.

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3. During the course of my career, I have become familiar with Executive Order 13526 (the E.O.). Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the E.O., information may be classified by an original classification authority based upon the level of damage to national security reasonably expected to result from unauthorized disclosure: CONFIDENTIAL (for damage); SECRET (for serious damage); or TOP SECRET (for exceptionally grave damage). I also previously served as an original classification authority on behalf of the agency in accordance with Section 1.3(3) of the E.O and associated delegations.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT):

4. GEOINT is the product of the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically-referenced activities on or about the earth.
5. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.
6. The term “imagery” means a likeness or presentation of any natural or manmade feature or related object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or representation was acquired, including—
 - products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and
 - likenesses or presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means.
7. The term “imagery intelligence” means the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials.
8. The term “geospatial information” means information that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the earth and includes—

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- data and information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and
- mapping, charting, geodetic data, and related products and services.

NGA and GEOINT:

9. The national security mission of NGA is to support U.S. national security objectives through assigned missions, including: (1) providing timely, relevant, and accurate GEOINT to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC); (2) supporting the geospatial intelligence requirements of U.S. government departments and agencies; (3) conducting other intelligence-related activities essential for U.S. national security; and (4) providing GEOINT in support of the combat objectives of the Armed Forces of the United States.
10. In furtherance of those objectives, NGA enters into arrangements with foreign partners for the exchange of GEOINT to further its combat support and national security missions, to support partners' own objectives where aligned with U.S. national security interests, and to promote and advance GEOINT practices consistent with those interests. NGA relies on these arrangements to facilitate the collection of GEOINT worldwide. This collection enables the production of products utilized by the DoD, the IC, and national security policymakers to help ensure the security of the United States.

The GEOINT Products at Issue:

11. In this case, two GEOINT products are at issue, both of which were produced by and under the control of NGA, and both of which I have reviewed.
12. These products describe the military preparations and related exercise planning conducted by the armed forces of a foreign government.

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13. These products contain sensitive national security information and remain currently and properly classified TOP SECRET pursuant to the E.O. They fall squarely within classification categories 1.4(a) and 1.4(c) of the E.O., as the information contained therein involves military plans or operations related to the national security of the United States and also implicates and sheds light on U.S. intelligence activities, including the use of intelligence sources and methods.
14. Foreign governments that have entered into GEOINT-sharing arrangements with NGA are very concerned when there are unauthorized disclosures of classified information, even if the classified information does not pertain to them.
15. As a result of such disclosures, foreign partners with which NGA has such arrangements may be less likely to share sensitive intelligence with the U.S. in the future, thus depriving NGA of critical information regarding the partner's activities—as well as those of U.S. adversaries about which the foreign partner has knowledge. Further, the products reveal the U.S. government's intelligence capabilities and collection priorities, information that foreign adversaries can exploit by adjusting their military and intelligence collection activities accordingly. Finally, these products can be “reverse-engineered” by foreign adversaries to determine the sources and methods by which the intelligence was collected, enabling them to adopt measures to counter, disrupt, or evade U.S. collection activities.
16. The occurrence of any or all of the above could reasonably be expected to impede or impair NGA's ability to collect, process, and disseminate GEOINT. One part of NGA's mission is to warn the U.S. and its allies of threats by keeping them supplied with accurate, current, and detailed GEOINT on or about the Earth. For the reasons set forth above, the unauthorized disclosure of the products in question could degrade NGA's


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ability to execute on that mission, and thus could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 10 day of December, 2024.



Jay M. Moeder

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